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They are trying to save their souls-and who but a fool could fail to
see that all that is the matter with their souls is that they have not
been able to get a decent existence for their bodies?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Food is not a luxury; indeed, it is not even an option. Yet our food
may very well be killing us: Food-borne illness is responsible for up to
9000 deaths annually in the United States2 and obesity-related deaths
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2011,
University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2006, Harvard University. This comment is dedicated
to the countless people who have touched my life and helped me get to this juncture in ways big
and small, but especially BDS, whose steadfast support and confidence in me has made so much
of the last three years possible; SMM, whose level of commitment to my success defies
description, and who somehow always knows when to be a mother and when to be a friend; BLM,
who inspires me to be a little better each day than I was the day before; SEM, who always makes
me laugh; and RTS and ARZ, without whose loyalty, humor, and senses of adventure I would
have thrown in the towel long ago. Special thanks to Prof. Stephen Diamond for being a sounding
board throughout the writing process and for unwittingly pushing me to challenge my
preconceived notions of the world; and Mrs. Barbara Bell for never letting me rest on my laurels.
1. UPrON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 237 (Barnes & Noble Books 2003) (1906).
2. PAUL S. MEAD ET. AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FOOD-RELATED
ILLNESS AND DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/
vol5no5/pdf/mead.pdf. Although there have been no reported deaths associated with the recent
outbreak of salmonella in eggs produced in Iowa, 1813 illnesses have been linked to the incident.
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toll 400,000 annually'-not including the uncounted deaths caused by
illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease, which are often directly
related to diet. The advent of gourmet food stores and the so-called
"organic" food movement may have lulled us into a false sense of secur-
ity-while it might be chic to say one eats "organic" food, is "organic"
really "safe"? For that matter, what does "organic" even mean?
In truth, organic food can be unsafe. Organic lettuce or spinach, com-
monly grown in soil to which manure has been added, can contain E.
coli bacteria, which can cause hemorrhagic colitis, acute kidney fail-
ure, and even death. ... Ironically, eating organic food may expose
people to more, not fewer risks from [E. coli]. Outbreaks of E. coli
0157:H7 stem not only from bad beef, but also from fresh fruit
juices, raw milk, lettuce, and minimally processed produce.4
Doesn't the very concept of "natural" food markets or "whole" foods
imply that the mainstream food supply is somehow unnatural or not
whole? A major criticism of the organic food movement is that only
wealthy people can afford to purchase good, clean, "healthy" produce
and meat that the movement purports to provide. As Americans, have
we created a society of food classism, where lower-income individuals
are forced to eat food that can, and probably will, kill them? In an era
when health care reform is the hot topic on everyone's lips, a vicious
cycle is being ignored: our health care system is severely taxed as every
year we become a less healthy nation, plagued by obesity and all its
related diseases, as well as food-borne epidemics that are literally "fed"
Investigation Update: Multistate Outbreak of Human Salmonella Enteriditis Infections Associated
with Shell Eggs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
Investigation Update], http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/enteritidis/.
3. Ali. H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 JAMA
1238-45 (2005), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/291/10/1238?ijkey=5e
2afe40d9c5948c92575e7b7285bbcd4ca95ac8&keytype2=tf ipsecsha; see also NEAL D. FORTIN,
Fooo REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 199-200 (2009) ("[T]he USDA ...
estimated the medical costs and losses in productivity of five major foodbome pathogens at
between $5.6 billion and $9.4 billion. However, this estimate does not include hepatitis A virus
and other significant pathogens ... . Further these aggregate estimates of cost do not include the
loss of food (i.e., recall and destruction), lost production, lost sales, or pain and suffering. The
aggregate estimates also do not encompass foodbome illness that is too mild to require medical
treatment .. . Finally, none of the aggregate estimates includes the costs of the chronic sequelae of
foodbome illness. . . . In this light, even the highest estimate, $164 billion per year for direct
medical costs, may be far below the total burden of foodborne illness.")
4. GREGORY E. PENCE, DESIGNER FOOD: MUTANT HARVEST OR BREADBASKET OF THE
WORLD? 1-2 (2001).
5. Bryan Walsh, The Real Cost of Cheap Food: America's Food Crisis and How to Fix It,
TIME, Aug. 31, 2009, at 31, 33. Buying "organic" or "sustainable" food can cost as much as
double what "conventional" food costs. With just one dollar a consumer can buy 1200 calories of
potato chips, or just 170-250 calories of fresh fruits and vegetables. Id.
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by our food infrastructure. 6 Why not work to make Americans healthier
before they need to make use of the health care system? Just like any
day in the life of most Americans, that goal begins and ends with food.
If we define negligence as the "failure to exercise the standard of care
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situa-
tion"' and culpable negligence as "negligent conduct that, while not
intentional, involves a disregard of the consequences likely to result
from one's actions,"' then aren't food producers, and the government,
liable to us?
This comment argues that the way in which Americans regulate the
food supply is fundamentally flawed, allowing consumers to become
sick, and in some cases die, from what they eat. The genetic modifica-
tion of food, the new frontier of biotechnology, is destined to follow in
conventional food's footsteps. Part II examines the way in which we
think about the food we eat and explores the ways in which our food is
making us sick. Part III traces food safety regulation from its origins and
looks critically at the current statutory and administrative scheme. Part
IV analyzes the way in which food safety has been litigated and can be
litigated in the future, making an argument for applying strict liability to
food cases. Finally, Part V explores a recent federal regulatory change
and looks briefly at the Minnesota state public health system in an effort
to find ways in which the federal system of food safety regulation can be
improved, while maintaining the importance of keeping the judicial sys-
tem open to food safety litigants.
II. SETTING THE SCENE
A. The Problem with Our Food
To understand the legal ramifications of food safety, one should
first examine the impact it has on our lives. In reality, ancient Man was
largely an herbivore-and stood at a meager four feet tall.' As the spe-
cies evolved and acquired the ability to hunt, diets included much more
meat, changing the quantity and quality of caloric intake. Brain size and
body size exploded, and Man moved farther away from the equator,
necessitating further dependence on meat and higher caloric intakes.o
The human obsession with food was born. Fast forward to the Industrial
6. See id. at 32. Obesity-related illness adds $147 billion a year to Americans' medical bills.
Id.
7. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 479 (3d ed. 2006).
8. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
9. PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF FOOD 5-6 (2008).
10. Id. at 6-7.
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Revolution: Mechanization equates food with a factory product."
Globalism, made possible by a new network of railroads and shipping
routes, made a new global system of food production possible.12 The
United States was at the forefront of production, seemingly "born to
superabundance."" As global populations grew, so too did the demand
for food, leading to the rise of the kind of "low-cost, high-volume agri-
culture" embodied by food industry giants, such as Nestl6:
[J]ust as farmers have been trapped in a cycle of overproduction,
companies like Nestl6 must sell more and more convenience, by way
of a steady stream of new and improved products that is becoming
very difficult to sustain. Beyond the enormous material costs of so
much processing and packaging, the sale of convenience depends not
only on increasingly aggressive promotional strategies (advertising
junk food in schools, for example, or selling baby formula to Third
World mothers) but on the continued decline in consumers' ability to
prepare, or even understand, their own food. If human beings are
indeed inherently "conservative when it comes to food," the success
of companies like Nestld marks one of the most radical and poten-
tially troubling developments in the story of food economy.14
Enter the biggest factor in changing the way we as a society think of
food: a fundamental post-World War II change in consumer demand.
The rise of the two-income household and the resulting consumer time
shortage forced companies to produce more "ready-to-eat" food that
could be manufactured and then prepared quickly and cheaply." This is
only one example of the birth of the, perhaps uniquely, American culture
of "instant gratification," but one that would change the most fundamen-
tal of human characteristics-the way we eat and, more importantly,
what we eat.
In fact, in the modem food business, most traditional food practices,
and most traditional foods, just don't work. As production has
become almost entirely automated, with vegetables diced, meats
ground, batters mixed, doughs extruded, and ready-to-serve dinners
assembled all by computer-controlled robots at rates of thousands of
units per minute, the food itself has had to be amended, often signifi-
cantly, in order to tolerate the process."
It is at this point that the issue gets more complicated. Food is fro-
zen, thawed, canned, and dehydrated. A battery of additions or amend-
ments are made in order to make the food last longer on the shelf of the
11. Id. at 32.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
672 [Vol. 65:669
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supermarket or pantry. A new brand of industry personnel called "food
engineers" discovered chemical upon chemical combination that could
be added to food to meet this growing consumer demand while increas-
ing company profit. Of course, these various chemical processes change
the nature of the food product by doing just that-changing the nature of
the food, thereby taking out color, flavor, and sometimes texture. So
naturally, the food engineers went back to work finding more chemical
processes that could be used to reverse what the initial chemical
processes took out." These advances have "allowed companies to dra-
matically simplify what was once a very complex process . . . and thus
gain a considerable measure of control over costs."" But at what "costs"
to consumers? A compound called diacetyl was used for years to create
the "butter" in microwave popcorn until it was taken off the market as a
"possible" cause of lung disease." Tetracycline, a common antibiotic,
was discovered as a "growth factor" for chicken, turkey, beef, and
pork.2 0 But isn't it possible that daily human consumption of residual
amounts of antibiotics will create a population resistance? 21
The problem is not merely limited to "processed" foods in the tradi-
tional sense: canned, frozen, ready-made products. A recent magazine
article painted the grim picture:
Somewhere in Iowa, a pig is being raised in a confined pen, packed
in so tightly with other swine that their curly tails have been chopped
off so they won't bite one another. To prevent him from getting sick
in such close quarters, he is dosed with antibiotics. The waste pro-
duced by the pig and his thousands of pen mates on the factory farm
where they live goes into manure lagoons that blanket neighboring
communities with air pollution and a stomach-churning stench. He's
fed on ... corn that was grown with ... millions of tons of chemical
fertilizer.
While Americans surely know that much of their food comes from
farms, the idea of the "farm" is a rather abstract one. Consumers are
often content to stroll down the aisles of mega supermarkets, blindly
picking up products without ever inquiring where they came from. Most
shoppers "do not know what farms, or what kind of farms [their food
17. Id. at 45-46.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 4.
21. See Antibiotic Resistance Questions and Answers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/anitbiotic-resistance-faqs.html (last
updated June 30, 2009); see also William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial
Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TuL. L. REv. 781, 784, 790
(2010).
22. Walsh, supra note 5, at 31.
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comes from], or where the farms are . . . or how farming today bears
little resemblance to farming as practiced a hundred years ago."2 3 Heavy
reliance on fertilizers has become necessary as a result of severe soil
erosion, but these fertilizers often contain poisonous heavy metals. Pesti-
cide residues linger on the produce we purchase, leading to cumulative
effects on health. Gigantic, near-perfect specimens of produce can be
seen almost everywhere and are the result of genetic manipulation of the
crop for the purposes of creating desirable characteristics, such as insect
resistance (while incidentally destroying flavor and texture).24 Cattle and
pigs are overproduced and herded into gigantic pens, fattened with pesti-
cide- and fertilizer-rich grain, injected with antibiotics, and then slaugh-
tered, creating 130 times more waste than humans. Oceans have been
over-fished to such an extent that only ten percent of large, commonly
eaten fish are left, forcing the birth of an unsustainable fish farming
industry.25 These facts, however, are not readily apparent in the super-
market aisle, leaving consumers effectively in the dark about what they
put into their own bodies. "Someone has to tell us whether the packaged
meat we see originated as an anemic calf (veal), an obese steer
(hamburger), an obese hog (pork sausage), or a grotesquely large-
breasted turkey (bologna)."2 6
B. The Role of Food Producers
Thus far it would seem clear that the American food system is bro-
ken. Yet it is just these kinds of advances that have permitted agribusi-
ness to substantially decrease global hunger in the face of a soaring
population. Furthermore, political and economic tensions make solving
the problems of food safety regulation less than simple. These tensions
are embodied in a piece of omnibus legislation that is pushed through
Congress every five to seven years, commonly known as the "Farm
Bill."2 7 The Bill addresses two main issues: (1) low-income food stamp
programs and (2) commodity crop incentives. The latter has as its goal
the promotion of stability for farmers in an inherently unstable, "inse-
cure and tempestuous" profession; however, it has become the basis for
the extraordinary surplus production of certain commodities, most nota-
23. HARVEY BLAr, AMERICA'S FOOD: WHAT You DON'T KNow ABOUT WHAT You EAT, at
vii (2008).
24. Id. at viii.
25. Id. at ix.
26. Id.
27. DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN's GUIDE TO A FOOD AND FARM BILL 22
(2007).
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bly corn. 28 This surplus has helped fuel the alarming dietary crisis
Americans now face, wherein one-third of the population is considered
"medically obese" and two-thirds are at least thirty pounds overweight.29
The Farm Bill is always riddled with political tensions, requiring no less
than nine congressional committees and subcommittees to agree before
the Bill passes muster.3 0 Yet interestingly, it is the incentives for com-
modity crop production that appear to be "untouchable," as producers
are able to successfully lobby for more money at the expense of such
programs as beginning farmer supports and farm-to-school distribution
arrangements. This creates a system of "flat funding" that creates an
uphill lobbying battle for constituents other than commodity producers
who want to get their share of the legislation funds. 32 Therein lies the
fight over what food sits on every American's dinner table nightly: the
political fight between the major mega-farms, dominated by corn and
meat producers, and everyone else. In an effort to guarantee themselves
an almost never-ending supply of cheap commodity crops that can then
be sold for almost any purpose, industry giants like Cargill and Archer
Daniels Midland virtually "writ[e] the Farm Bills." Not only does this
make it almost impossible for smaller farmers to succeed unless they
work for such giants, it floods our food supply with corn-based products,
such as high-fructose corn syrup, that are virtually inescapable and that
directly contribute to serious health threats such as diabetes and obesity.
Add to these domestic tensions a fundamental distrust by Europeans of
all things American, most notably food imports, and what seems like a
simple and basic human necessity becomes an even more complex
global industry. 3 4
From an economic perspective, farmers are faced with what econo-
mists call differentiation. Unlike cars, clothes, or other market products,
food products are all basically the same: A cucumber is a cucumber and
a steak is a steak. It is almost impossible for a farmer to distinguish, or
differentiate, his product from a competing farmer's. The only way to
guarantee his market share without decreasing his profit margin is to
find a way to lower his price by lowering his operating costs, drawing
consumers to buy more of his product than his competitor' s.3 Lowering
28. Id. at 22-23. Interestingly, it is just this type of surplus that led to the farm crisis of the
Great Depression. See id. at 34.
29. Id at 23 ("Driven by government subsidized corn sweeteners, saturated fats, and food
additives, this dietary crisis disproportionately affects children, people of color, and the poor.")
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 39.
34. See generally PENCE, supra note 4, at 9-26; see also discussion infra at pp. 227-29.
35. ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 36.
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costs can take the form of decreasing contract prices with participating
farmers, working with a minimal labor force, or keeping minimal safety
standards. No matter how it manifests itself, it amounts to cutting cor-
ners with your food. Processed food manufacturers face the opposite
problem: They attempt to add to the cost of their product enough to raise
their price and profit margin but not enough to make the product too
expensive and unable to compete in the marketplace. Out of the money
paid for a box of cereal, for example, the cereal company still enjoys a
gross profit margin of approximately 44 percent, even after the super-
market cut and basic costs. These companies differentiate their products
through heavy promotion and branding, often inducing consumers to
buy into an image. As a result, not only are more and more food manu-
facturers entering the processed (i.e., unhealthy and largely corn-based)
market, but more and more consumers choose to buy processed foods
over fresh foods. 6
In light of these tensions, it becomes clear that the food industry,
and in particular the arena of food safety, must be regulated. In fact,
food safety regulation finds its roots in the Roman Empire and early
Judeo-Christian civilizations. As the various countries of Europe
emerged from the ruins of the Roman Empire, food safety laws were
adopted and molded to the needs of individual nations."
By the nineteenth century, the dangers of chemical contamination of
food became known. As a result of this new public health threat, new
scientific knowledge and understanding of food chemistry emerged
and created a professional discipline for food safety. As the century
progressed, the regulation of food safety and food purity, based on
the analysis of chemical and food composition, provided the basis for
modem food sciences and food safety regulation. At the end of the
nineteenth century, new technologies for food preservation and con-
servation were developed in response to international food trade and
growing consumer demand for processed food.3
The twentieth century brought exponential technological advances in
food storage and food production methods, while also heralding an
explosion of food safety concerns, such as food-borne illnesses. Addi-
tionally, the rise of a more global food industry demanded a more com-
plex system of food safety regulation that could apply across national
borders."
36. Id. at 37-39.
37. Reba A. Carruth, Socio-Economic Foundations of Food Safety Regulation, in GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES: TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
HARMONIZATION AND MULTILATERAL POLICY COOPERATION FOR FOOD SAFETY 3, 4 (Reba A.
Carruth ed., 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5.
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C. The American Obesity Epidemic
Finally, it is impossible to consider the American food system and
its corresponding regulation without delving into the alarming preva-
lence of obesity in the United States population. The scientific and medi-
cal communities define obesity as a body mass index of 30 or greater,
which can be calculated from a person's weight and height. Body mass
index is a "reasonable indicator" of the kind of weight that leads to
health problems. "Obesity is a major risk factor for cardiovascular dis-
ease . . . cancer, and type 2 diabetes[;]"' obesity-related deaths toll a
staggering 400,000 annually.4 1 Perhaps even more troubling, obesity is
more prevalent among Hispanic and black non-Hispanic communities, 4 2
providing a correlation between socioeconomic status and, ultimately,
health.4 3 Childhood obesity is on the rise as well, with a staggering 14.6
percent of low-income preschool-age children considered obese in
2008." Childhood obesity in particular results in an increased burden on
the U.S. economy, including increased healthcare costs, time lost from
work and school, and future lack of productivity due to health
problems.4 5 While genetics can certainly play a part in making one
obese,4 6 it would seem clear that what one chooses to eat has at least
something to do with it. But is it all just a matter of personal responsibil-
ity? That may have been the tobacco industry's argument-it's the indi-
vidual who chooses to smoke, not the company that forces him to-and
while a higher degree of consumer responsibility must be demanded, the
solutions to this crisis are far from being that simple.47
40. U.S. Obesity Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/obesity/data/trends.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2010).
41. See Mokdad, supra note 3.
42. U.S. Obesity Trends, supra note 40.
43. See generally Census 2000 Fact Sheet for Black Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
factfinder.census.gov (follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheet for a Race, Ethnic,
or Ancestry Group" hyperlink; then select "Black alone;" then follow "Go" hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 2, 2011); Census 2000 Fact Sheet for Hispanic Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://fact
finder.census.gov (follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheet for a Race, Ethnic, or
Ancestry Group" hyperlink; then select "Hispanic or Latino of any race;" then follow "Go"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 2, 2011). As of 2000 the median income of both groups was well
below that of the total U.S. population, barely half in the case of black families. Overweight and
Obesity: Causes and Consequences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.
cdc.gov/obesity/causes/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2009).
44. Obesity Prevalence Among Low-Income, Preschool-Aged Children 1998-2008, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhoodlowincome.html
(last updated Mar. 16, 2010).
45. See Joan R. Rothenberg, In Search of the Silver Bullet: Regulatory Models to Address
Childhood Obesity, 65 FOOD DRUG L.J. 185 (2010).
46. See sources cited supra note 43.
47. See HANK CARDELLO, STUFFED: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT WHO'S (REALLY) MAKING
AMERICA FAT, at xiv (2009).
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So who is making America fat? As Hank Cardello notes,
"[p]ointing the fickle finger of fat responsibility at any one group is
ultimately futile and will do little to solve the problem."4 8 Food execu-
tives certainly play their part; despite the fact that they provide a product
that is essential to sustaining life, food companies are still for-profit
businesses. Ultimately, these executives need the consumer to buy as
much of their product as possible in order to fulfill the omnipresent "bot-
tom line."49 The more they sell, the greater the company's profit and
their own bonuses. In order to do this, food executives have become
adept at following the trends of consumer demand-and we consumers
don't always want what's best for us. Instead, we want more bang for
our buck."o The true "bottom line" is that what's holistically best for the
consuming population has almost nothing to do with the decisions food
executives make about their products, whereas "coerc[ing]" and
"manipulat[ing]" consumers into buying as much food as possible takes
center stage.5 ' Cardello explains:
The executive mantra [is] bigger packages, bigger servings, and more
of everything per container. In the process, portion size got danger-
ously out of hand. We went from "buy one, get one free," to "buy it
by the dozens and save." Unfortunately, this also dictated how much
we ate. We began to crave oversized entrees and 20-ounce Mountain
Dews, and the packaged goods companies were more than willing to
oblige, ignoring the inherent risks behind a nation fueled by
processed foods and gallons of soda.52
Restaurant executives engage in similar tactics. In order to increase
profits, restaurants drastically increase the size of the portions they
serve. The increase in ingredient cost is nominal, but the potential profits
soar. The effect on patrons' health doesn't even enter into the equa-
tion-it's a question of survival." Then again, consumers make it easy:
America eats out more than ever before. This is a recent-meaning
approximately the last half[-]century-cultural concept, fomented in
part by our endlessly busy lifestyles. Mom and Dad are working and
they're exhausted after picking the kids up from after-school activi-
ties, so they don't have time to cook. And authorities agree, the more
you rely on someone else to cook your food, the less you know
what's in it.. .. Mostly, the time-pressed consumer eats high-calorie,
low-nutrition fare.54
48. Id.
49. See id. at 17-18.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 19.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 25.
[Vol. 65:669678
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The advent of the "combo" meal made matters worse: Now consumers
don't even have to think about what they're eating, and they justify that
lack of thought as saving a few hard-earned pennies." Are restaurants
merely responding to customers' needs, or are customers justifying their
bad habits as literally just eating what they're fed?
Okay, so instead of visiting one of these chain restaurants that fool
you into eating more food of lesser quality, you choose to go to the
grocery store and prepare food at home; surely, this will allow you
greater control over what you actually eat and virtually guarantees that
you will eat "better," right? Wrong. "Because there is so much pressure
on the bottom line, [supermarkets] look to cut costs and extract the max-
imum promotional dollars from the producer companies."" Essentially,
supermarkets have ultimate control over the placement of food through-
out the store, and they make sure that the food you see the most is the
food they have the greatest profit margin on. That means food that is
cheaper to produce (full of chemical fillers and cheap corn products) and
food made by companies that can afford to pay for the lucrative real
estate: end-of-aisle displays and eye-level shelf space. Supermarkets
strategically place "power" foods, such as meat, eggs, and milk, all the
way in the back of the store in order to ensure that you have to walk
through the aisles to get what they know you won't leave without,
encouraging you to be attracted by impulse buys that are well-placed to
catch your eye.5 Of course, the overly sweetened children's cereals can
be found two shelves from the bottom, at perfect child eye level.59 The
organic food movement, spearheaded by high-end supermarkets, such as
Whole Foods, have "lured [us] into a false feeling of comfort and secur-
ity [from] thinking that everything in the store is good for you."o60 After
all, it's more expensive so it must be better. This may very well be at
least partially true of the largely (but not entirely) pesticide- and preser-
vative-free produce and meat, but the packaged goods are of the same
high-calorie, over-sized variety as any mainstream supermarket."1 While
it is certainly a step in the right direction, organic food producers are still
for-profit businesses and still have a bottom line to which to answer,
making them just as vulnerable to the less-than-honorable motives we
55. Id. at 26 ("Sure, there's a small price break ... [b]ut the average check goes up, because
the combo meal encourages the customer to buy more.").
56. Id. at 21.
57. Id. at 33-35 ("They need you to keep buying the 70-percent-margin boxes of sugar-laced
Frosted Flakes . . . because they're staples for the quarterly shareholder reports.") (emphasis
added).
58. Id. at 32.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id. at 45.
2011] 679
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
might find abhorrent in traditional food producers.62
The food industry is already heavily regulated. Yet sufficient loop-
holes exist to allow the types of abuses discussed above to be pervasive.
One of the only lawsuits yet to be filed in tort on the subject of obesity
was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
sought.63 The plaintiffs were a class of infants and minors who had con-
sumed McDonald's products and alleged that as a result "such consump-
tion [had] been a significant or substantial factor in the development of
their obesity, diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, ele-
vated cholesterol intake, and/or other detrimental and adverse health
effects and/or diseases."' The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs had
been misled through false advertising into believing that McDonald's
food products were nutritious, that McDonald's failed adequately to dis-
close the true nutritious value (or lack thereof) of its food, and that the
company engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices through
such advertising campaigns.65 The trial judge cited three main reasons
why such a claim could not proceed:
First, if traditional rules are followed, plaintiffs would have to show
that their obesity was caused by food, not by failure to exercise, other
lifestyle choices, or genetics. Second, plaintiffs would have to show
that a particular defendant's food caused this harm . . .. Finally ...
there will have to be a major change in the definition of what consti-
tutes a "product defect" for liability to ensue.6 6
Significantly, however, on appeal the circuit court found that, while
these factors were indeed relevant to this type of claim, the information
was properly the subject of discovery and not grounds for dismissal. 7
This clearly left the door open for potential subsequent litigation in an
effort to force food producers to take responsibility for the quality of the
food they "push" onto consumers. Several other lawsuits in the obesity
context, all based on alleged misrepresentations, have settled out of
court.68 The idea behind this type of litigation, sometimes called "regu-
lation through litigation," is that the threat of litigation and massive risks
of liability will force behavioral change among the relevant class of
defendants. While there must always remain an avenue open to liti-
62. Id. at 47.
63. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2003).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *2.
66. VicTOR E. ScHwARTz & PIL S. GOLDBERG, CLOSING THE FOOD COURT: WHY
LEGISLATIVE ACTION Is NEEDED TO CURB OBESITY LAWSUrrs 9 (2004).
67. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511-12 (2d Cir. 2005). The case was
remanded for further proceedings, but no disposition is currently available.
68. ScHWARTz & GOLDBERG, supra note 66, at 11.
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gants-foreclosing the right of a litigant to vindicate his or her right in a
court of law would be tantamount to denying such a right exists-it can
be argued that such a process is designed to settle disputes between par-
ties, and not to establish public policy. 69 A fundamental change in legis-
lative regulation, through the authority of relative agencies and
otherwise, must be effectuated.
D. Genetically Modified Food
The common understanding of biotechnology is that it refers to the
science of modifying deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") and other genetic
material of an organism in order to change its essential traits. Genetic
engineering is the process of using biotechnology modification of
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid ("rDNA"), also called gene splicing,
to produce desirable traits in organisms. Finally, the term "genetically
modified" is the way genetically engineered food is more commonly
referred to-"[t]he term 'genetically engineered' more precisely indi-
cates that humans have directly engineered the DNA. In the broadest
sense, all food crops have been genetically modified by humans using
conventional cultivation and propagation techniques." 0 Genetically
modified food is fundamentally different than the so-called "hybrid"
food that we have been eating for decades. Genetic modification tech-
niques relevant to the scope of this comment allow "scientists the ability
to isolate genes and to introduce new traits into foods without simultane-
ously introducing many other undesirable traits, as may occur with tradi-
tional breeding[,] . . . [and] enable the transfer of traits from bacteria or
animals into plants."" The major rationale for developing genetically
engineered food is that it affords the ability to increase crop yields by
changing the genetic makeup of the crop to resist herbicides and pests.72
Yet risks have been recognized:
[T]he use of biotechnology has also raised concerns about its poten-
tial risks to the environment and people. For example, some people
fear that common plant pests could develop resistance to the intro-
duced pesticides in GM crops that were supposed to combat them.
Further some fear that crops modified to be tolerant to herbicides
could foster the evolution of "super weeds." Finally, some fear that
69. Id. at 2.
70. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 413.
71. Genetically Engineered Foods: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Basic Research of the
H. Comm. on Science, (1999) (statement of James H. Maryanski, Ph.D., Biotechnology
Coordinator, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration)
[hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm 1 15032.htm.
72. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-566, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: EXPERTS
Vimw REGIMEN OF SAFETY TESTS AS ADEQUATE, BUT FDA's EVALUATION PROCESS COULD BE
ENHANCED (2002) [hereinafter GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE REPORT].
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scientists might unknowingly create or enhance a food allergen or
toxin."
Despite the inherent risks, genetically modified food can have a positive
effect on the world's food supply. By making crops more resistant to
bacteria, food manufacturers can essentially produce larger quantities of
food. This important contribution cannot be ignored in a global climate
where as much as 75 percent of the population in some countries is
undernourished.74
III. How AMERICANS REGULATE FOOD
A. The History of Food Safety Regulation
As introduced above, the American food industry is already heavily
regulated. As early as the fourth century, ancient Roman writers dis-
cussed the problem of food adulteration, and laws were put in place to
punish transgressions with condemnation to the mines or even exile."
Later, trade guilds banded together to impose stringent food safety regu-
lations purely as a means of strengthening the economy of the food
industry, recognizing that providing a "purer" product could give a com-
petitive edge. In the New World, colonial-era food regulation was
almost exclusively the province of local and state governments, with no
unified federal presence in the industry at all. Finally, in the late 1880s
Congress began taking action against adulterated food, passing first a
ban on adulterated tea and later the so-called "oleo-margarine statute,"
both designed to protect producers from the competition of adulterated
products that could be sold at lower prices with larger profit margins.
As scientific progress allowed for new ways to produce adulterated
food, so too did it allow for its detection:77
We face a new situation in history. Ingenuity, striking hands with
cunning trickery, compounds a substance to counterfeit an article of
food. It is made to look like something it is not; to taste and smell like
something it is not; to sell like something it is not, and so deceive the
purchaser.
As food became a product of the factory, the demand for regulation
grew. Dr. Harvey Wiley's leadership of the U.S. Bureau of Chemistry
73. Id.
74. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Prevalence of
Undernourishment in Total Population (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/food-
security-statistics/en/.
75. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 4.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 5. This kind of adulteration was particularly prevalent in the "oleo-margarine"
industry where adulterated butter and fats were colored to look like real butter. Id.
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and his use of the crude but highly publicized "Poison Squad" to
increase awareness of the potential hazards of adulterated food helped
garner public support for food safety regulation.
The cry for reform finally hit its peak in the first decade of the
twentieth century, largely thanks to a new wave of sensationalist jour-
nalism and the publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, both of
which exposed in gruesome detail the unsanitary practices of the meat-
packing industry. In response, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug
Acts0 and the Meat Inspection Act" in 1906, adding regulatory func-
tions to the U.S. Bureau of Chemistry (the precursor to the present-day
Food and Drug Administration) and requiring inspection of all "cattle,
sheep, swine, goats, and horses" during the slaughtering process.82
Although it did not take long for calls for expansion and strengthening
of the statutes to begin, change would not come until more than 107
people died, including many children, from taking a form of sulfanila-
mide, a form of the antibiotic sulfa that had been doctored with harmful
taste additives. The manufacturer had not performed any safety tests on
the product before making it available to the public because none were
required.8 3 This catastrophic mistake set up a pattern that would con-
tinue in American food safety-if it hasn't killed enough people yet, it
doesn't need to be regulated. As a result, Congress passed the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FD&C Act") in 1938, which mostly increased
regulation over drugs, cosmetics, and therapeutic devices in response to
the sulfanilamide disaster. However, among other subsidiary regulations,
it did require that "safe tolerances be set for unavoidable poisonous sub-
stances in food."8 A dangerous precedent had been set; there was now
federal recognition and acceptance of food that was less than pure. After
all, a "safe tolerance" still means that the food contains poison. What
may be a "safe" amount for a full-grown man may not be so safe for a
three-year-old child. The use of the word "unavoidable" sends a clear
message to the food industry: We expect to have poison in our food, and
that's okay. Furthermore, such acceptance implies that some degree of
impurity, even if it makes us sick from time to time, is federally
sanctioned.
In the face of this linguistic loophole, food laws continued to be
enacted and amended as Congress struggled to react to outbreaks of ill-
79. Id.
80. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
81. Federal Meat Inspection Act, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (1906) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2006)).
82. Id.
83. FORTN, supra note 3, at 6.
84. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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ness and other breaches that were fully permissible under the initial reg-
ulatory scheme." The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 demanded
"evaluation" of food additives to determine safety." The Delaney
Clause" implicitly required testing of food substances on laboratory ani-
mals and banned any such substance that was found to cause cancer in
test subjects. The Color Additive Amendment of 1960 required safety of
all color additives in food, drugs, and cosmetics88-a concept we now
take for granted. A rash of botulism outbreaks resulting from canned
foods sparked passage of the Low-Acid Food Processing Regulations of
1973.89 Cyanide-induced deaths from Tylenol resulted in the (now ubiq-
uitous) requirements of the Tamper-Resistant Packaging Regulations of
1982.90 A year later, Congress made such tampering a federal crime by
enacting the Federal Anti-Tampering Act.91
The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a marked para-
dox: The "health nut" wave spurred companies to increasingly market
foods purported to "fulfill health concerns" while the food industry con-
tinued to make (dangerous) strides in food processing on a national,
rather than a local, level.9 2 In a seemingly revolutionary step in the right
direction, in 1990 Congress required all packaged foods to be labeled
with nutritional information, and for that information to conform to
Food and Drug Administration terms, by enacting the Nutritional Label-
ing and Education Act.93 It is against this backdrop of after-the-fact reg-
ulation-legislation in response to major food safety breaches, as
opposed to in anticipation thereof-that we now turn to who, exactly,
regulates our food.9 4
B. The Current State of Affairs
The majority of direct federal oversight for food regulation in the
United States comes from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
and the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). These two
85. See generally id. at 6-8.
86. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (current version
at 21 U.S.C. § 331) (2006)).
87. Id.
88. Color Additive Amendment of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (current version at
21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)).
89. 21 C.F.R. § 108.35 (1977).
90. 21 C.F.R. § 700.25 (1982).
91. Federal Anti-Tampering Act, Pub. L. No. 98-127, 97 Stat. 831 (1983) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006)).
92. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
93. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006)).
94. See generally INTERNATIONAL FOOD LAW 539-614 (Jocelyn Kellam & Elizabeth Toni
Guarino eds. 2000).
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agencies, however, share some portion of that role with other agencies,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau ("TTB"). 5 The FDA has jurisdiction over both imported
and domestic food, except meat and poultry, bottled water, and wine
with less than seven percent alcohol content.9 6 This agency performs a
variety of functions, including inspecting food production sites, analyz-
ing food samples for safety, establishing safety guidelines for food pro-
ducers (and, ostensibly, enforcing them), requiring safety recalls of
products, and working with foreign governments to ensure safety of
imports.97 Critically, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") typically only get involved once an "official" food-borne dis-
ease outbreak is reported.98 It also has primary responsibility for main-
taining a "nationwide system of food[-borne] disease surveillance" but
does not necessarily work with other agencies, such as the FDA, to pre-
vent such outbreaks.99
The USDA is primarily responsible for conducting inspections of
all domestic and imported meat and poultry, including any related prod-
ucts (i.e., processed or frozen foods containing meat and poultry).1" It is
also responsible for regulating processed egg products-as opposed to
fresh eggs, which fall under the FDA's jurisdiction. 101 The USDA's
jurisdiction is derived largely from the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 1 0 2
the Poultry Products Inspection Act,103 and the Egg Products Inspection
Act,1" all of which vest in the agency the responsibility to inspect ani-
mals for disease before and after slaughter, inspect slaughter and
processing locations and, like the FDA, establish and enforce guidelines
for the safety of these types of products."o5
The EPA has primary responsibility over drinking water 1 06-bot-
95. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 23.
96. See scattered sections of 21 C.F.R. See also FORTIN, supra note 3, at 24.
97. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 24.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 25.
101. Id.
102. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-625 (2006).
103. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472 (2006).
104. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1056 (2006).
105. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 25; see also Brett T. Schwemer and Jolyda 0. Swaim, Food:
Meat and Poultry Inspection, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 127, 130-46 (David G.
Adams et al., eds., Food and Drug Law Institute 2008).
106. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 25.
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tled water is regulated by the FDA' 0 -and pesticide safety,os which is
largely enacted in the form of setting tolerance levels for pesticide resi-
dues in foods.1 o9 This responsibility necessarily requires cooperation
with the FDA and the USDA in order to regulate pesticide runoff and
contamination of food animal drinking water. The National Marine Fish-
eries Service ("NMFS") inspects and certifies fish and seafood products,
but significantly this is done through a voluntary, paid service.o How-
ever, the NMFS also inspects fishing vessels, plants, and retail facilities,
but only for federal sanitation standards, not for product safety.1 ' The
TTB (formerly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) regulates
alcoholic beverages (except the category of wine that is under the FDA's
jurisdiction), including labeling and adulteration.1 12 The United States
Customs Service works with various other aforementioned regulatory
agencies to inspect all incoming and outgoing food products according
to U.S. law."' The FTC is charged with enforcing federal laws prohibit-
ing unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices, which most often are
found in the area of food advertising." 4 Finally, the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") has jurisdiction over any individual or
company for alleged violations of food safety laws and can seize by
court order unsafe food products that have not yet entered the market-
place." Additionally, much of this delegated responsibility becomes
further delegated to state and local governments, which often have more
manpower and more financial resources to perform these regulatory
tasks. This non-exhaustive list of federal agencies that have a hand in
ensuring that the food we eat every day is "safe" highlights the "haphaz-
ard patchwork" nature of food safety regulation. In the same way that
legislation is enacted as a reaction to safety issues as they arise, so, too,
is agency power delegated." 6 The result is that when an outbreak
occurs, it is often not clear which agency had responsibility over the
precise safety issue that caused it, and it is rarely possible to identify a
clear point in the regulation and inspection process that led to the prob-
107. Id. at 24.
108. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973
(1972) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006)).
109. Id.; see also discussion supra p. 215-16. These types of linguistic loopholes continued to
be pervasive in our food safety schemes. Id.




114. Id. at 27
115. Id.
116. Id. at 28.
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lem. The patchwork merely allows agencies to point the finger at each
other and results in yet more patchwork legislation and delegation.
In addition to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 1 7 -and its seem-
ingly never-ending slew of amendments' -and the Federal Meat
Inspection Act,1 19 there are two other major pieces of federal legislation
noteworthy to this discussion. The Food Quality Protection Act of
1996120
mandates a single, health-based standard for all pesticides in all
foods; provides special protections for infants and children; expedites
approval of safer pesticides; and creates incentives for the develop-
ment and maintenance of effective crop protection tools for American
farmers. It also requires periodic re-evaluation of pesticide registra-
tions and tolerances to ensure that the scientific data supporting pesti-
cide registrations will remain up to date in the future.12 1
Significantly, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 eliminated the FDA's
requirement of agency pre-market approval for most packaging and sub-
stances that might come into contact with food.12 2 Instead, it implements
a system of self-regulation whereby the manufacturer determines
whether the product is safe and then simply notifies the agency of its
intent to use the substance. The FDA then has 120 days to object, and
the product enters the marketplace.123 A critical question raised by this
new system of self-regulation is whether the FDA can reasonably deter-
mine if an objection is necessary simply by notice, as opposed to the
inspection and testing the agency would have done under the old system.
If one analogizes to the system of self-regulation of the American bank-
ing system implemented in the last decade of the twentieth century, can
the American public reasonably believe that a food manufacturer would
blow the whistle on one of its own unsafe products if the FDA has no
power to inspect or test it for itself?
C. Legislative Flaws
Although an exhaustive discussion of the many facets of, and defi-
nitions contained in, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act would be super-
fluous to this discussion, it is important to highlight that the Act
117. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
118. See discussion supra p. 216.
119. Federal Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967) (current version at
21 U.S.C. § 601) (2006)).
120. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.
121. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 31.
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provides specific food classifications from which is derived agency
jurisdiction over different products.' 24 In addition, the Act provides spe-
cific definitions for the terms "food" and "food additive," which become
important in analyzing whether a given product or substance is regulated
at all. These definitions are:
The term "food" means
(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals
(2) chewing gum, and
(3) articles used for components of any other such article. 125
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use of
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or
indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the
characteristic of any food ... if such substance is not generally recog-
nized ... as having been adequately shown . . . to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use . . . .126
These definitions highlight the importance of determining a product's or
substance's "intended use" in order to properly classify it.'2 7 Also
important to note is that a substance only comes under the definition of
"food additive" if it is reasonably expected to become a component of a
food product. This implicitly and glaringly opens the door for substances
not so intended, but present anyway, to be unregulated as falling outside
the strictly circumscribed definition. In contrast, the definition for
"food" is completely devoid of any reference to intent. However, "a
court may consider the intended use of the product in considering
whether it is a food."1 2 8
As our civilization continues to become increasingly global, so, too,
does our food supply. Changes in the nature and volume of imports have
completely overwhelmed the FDA and made it increasingly harder to
regulate.129 The United States is receiving more and more raw materials
124. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 39.
125. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2006).
126. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2006) (emphasis added). It is important to note that this definition
does not include pesticides or color additives.
127. See United States v. Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 344 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1965) (finding honey to be classified as a drug because of the company's therapeutic claims);
United States v. Sterling Vinegar & Honey, 338 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding vinegar and
honey to be classified as a drug because of the company's therapeutic claims); United States v.
Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957) (finding tea to be classified as a drug because of the
company's therapeutic claims); United States v. 500 Plastic Bottles, Civ. No. 88-1482-FR, 1989
WL 131257 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 1989) (finding water to be classified as a drug because of the
company's therapeutic claims).
128. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 46.
129. Kelly Chen & Rosa Dunnegan-Mallat, H.R. 3610, The Food and Drug Import Safety Act
of 2007, 42 INrr'L LAW. 1339, 1340 (2008). FDA-regulated imports have increased almost ten-fold
since 1993. Id.
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from countries with little or no regulatory scheme in place.130 This trend
has led to a surge of new risks, including "food-borne diseases not previ-
ously identified[,] ... dangerous industrial compounds, and carcinogenic
drugs in food imports."13 1 The FDA's limitations in dealing with this
flood of potentially dangerous imports can be traced to two factors: a
growth of responsibility without a commensurate growth in budget and
an inherently reactive, versus proactive, system. 132 As a result, the pro-
posed Food and Drug Import Safety Act sought to amend the FD&C Act
to solve at least part of these problems by increasing funding for import
inspections, restricting ports of entry for food to cities where there are
preexisting FDA laboratories, establishing country-of-origin labeling
requirements for imported products, and increasing fines for
violations. 133
Of significant interest to this discussion is section 10 of the Act,
which would provide the FDA with recall authority "if there is a reason-
able probability that a food could 'cause serious, adverse health conse-
quences or death.' "134 The first obvious point of discussion regarding
this language is that it continues the long-standing "probability" decision
calculus in determining what we, as consumers, are allowed to eat.13 5
Even if there is a possibility that the product will "cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death," the product would still pass FDA muster
so long as the subjective "reasonable probability" standard is not met.13 6
The second issue glaringly highlighted by this language is the current
lack of authority to recall products: "Presently, 'FDA may not unilater-
ally order a recall even of a product that is life threatening."'"3 7 Yet, not
surprisingly, "[t]he food industry agrees that the current voluntary recall
program works well."13 8 Data indicates, however, that consumers
believe that the government should be able to recall products, a senti-
ment echoed by such interest groups as the Center for Science in the
Public Interest. 3 9 Despite the reactive system of our federal regulatory
scheme, and despite widely publicized outbreaks of disease here and
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1340-41.
133. Id. at 1343-47.
134. Id. at 1347 (quoting H.R. 3610, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007)).
135. See discussion supra p. 22.
136. Chen & Dunnegan-Mallat, supra note 129, at 1347-48.
137. Id. at 1348 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The recent massive Iowa egg recall
highlights this flaw; it was not until two producers voluntarily recalled their products that public
attention was drawn to the severe salmonella outbreak. See Investigation Update, supra note 2.
138. Chen & Dunnegan-Mallat, supra note 129, at 1347.
139. Id.
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abroad,140 there is still a legislative reluctance to grant ultimate recall
authority. In the wake of these public disasters, doesn't this exhibit a
disregard for the consequences likely to result from such reluctance?1 4 1
The Act was never passed, dying at the conclusion of the 110th
Congress.142
Although the issues surrounding nutritional labeling of food are
beyond the scope of this comment,' 4 3 it is noteworthy to include a brief
discussion of the regulation of so-called trans fats. Trans fatty acids can
be found in hydrogenated vegetable oil, a key ingredient in the staples of
American diets: "margarine, commercial cakes and cookies, doughnuts,
potato chips, crackers, popcorn, nondairy creamers, whipped toppings,
gravy mixes, cake mixes, frozen French fries and pizzas, fish sticks, and
virtually all fried foods, unless you fry them yourself in unhydrogenated
oils."" More than a decade ago, a professor at the Harvard School of
Public Health estimated that 30,000 deaths from heart disease per year
could be attributed to the use of hydrogenated oils and the resulting
trans fats, characterizing it as "the biggest food processing disaster in
U.S. history."l4 5 In fact, the FDA itself concluded that "trans fat is even
more harmful than saturated fat."l 4 6 The Center for Science in Public
Interest argues that these types of oils are "absolutely unnecessary in the
food supply" and eliminating them "is probably the single easiest, fast-
est, cheapest way to save tens of thousands of lives each year."' 4 7 Yet
despite these warnings, and despite an admission from an FDA advisory
panel itself, the agency declined to ban trans fat from processed foods
140. See, e.g., Recall Expands to More Than Half a Billion Eggs, MSNB.com (Aug. 20, 2010,
6:57 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38741401/ns/health-food_safety; see also Investigation
Update, supra note 2.
141. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7; see also Chen & Dunnegan-Mallat, supra
note 129, at 1349 ("Under section fourteen . .. a label would be required for those meat, poultry,
or seafood products with carbon monoxide. . . .") (emphasis added). Instead of prohibiting the use
of carbon monoxide to preserve the color of the food product (implying that the product isn't fresh
enough to maintain color on its own), the Act merely requires that the consumer be informed of its
presence. Id.
142. H.R. 3610 [110th]: Food and Drug Import Safety Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-3610 (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). A new piece of legislation that
purports to grant the FDA more authority to order recalls was introduced in the wake of the Iowa
salmonella outbreak. As of this writing, the bill has been passed in the Senate, but it is still not
clear whether it will be enacted or what the final wording will be. Bill Tomson, Food-Safety Bill
Clears Senate, WSJ.com, Nov. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article-email/SB 10001424052748
704648604575620623733347294-IMyQjAxMTAwMDEwNzExNDcyWj.html.
143. See Mel Drozen & Eve Pelonis, Food Labeling, in FoOD AND DRUG LAW AND
REGULATION 77-101 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 2008), for information on the basic labeling
requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.
144. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 112 (internal citations omitted).
145. Id. (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. (internal citations omitted).
147. Id. at 112-13.
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altogether, opting instead to require that all packaged foods include a
label advising consumers of the amount of trans fat in one serving of the
product. However, trans fat does not have to be listed at all if the prod-
uct contains less than half a gram of total fat per serving and the packag-
ing makes no claims about fat content."' In other words, the FDA, in
full knowledge of the consequences of ingesting the trans fats that are
ubiquitous in the processed food staples of American diets, disregarded
the consequences likely to result from allowing them to remain in the
food supply,14 9 performing a "conscious . . . omission" without regard
for such likely consequences."o
"Congress has opined that a determination of safety may be situa-
tional and, as a result, can often be assessed against a background of
social and economic values, depending on the nature of the food and the
nature of the risk."' In other words, safety is not an absolute. This is
nowhere better illustrated than by examining the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act itself:
Any poisonous or deleterious substances added to any food, except
where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot
be avoided by good manufacturing practice, shall be deemed to be
unsafe .. .; but when such substance is so required or cannot be so
avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quan-
tity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the
protection of public health . . . . [S]uch food shall not . .. be consid-
ered to be adulterated within the meaning of . . . this title. In deter-
mining the quantity of such added substance to be tolerated . . . the
Secretary shall take into account the extent to which the use of such
substance is required or cannot be avoided . . . .
The Act conveniently provides statutory authority for the FDA know-
ingly to allow substances considered poisonous or deleterious to enter
the food supply if it's "unavoidable.""' However, the Act is devoid of
any definition of what "unavoidable" means in this context, or who
decides whether the additional substance is truly unavoidable. In fact,
food that contains such substances in quantities below the stated toler-
ance is not even considered adulterated. This loophole provides an
148. Id. at 113.
149. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 480.
150. Id. Gross negligence is defined as "[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless
disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another party, who may typically recover
exemplary damages." Id. In this context, the legal duty arises from the statutory grant of authority
to the FDA to regulate the safety of domestic food products.
151. Fred H. Degnan, Food Safety, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION, supra note
143, at 17, 27.
152. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2006) (emphasis added).
153. Id.; see also. 21 C.F.R. § 109.3 (2010).
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opportunity for food manufacturers to claim that additions are unavoida-
ble and necessary for the production of their product without repercus-
sion. Under this standard, a manufacturer can ostensibly claim that the
inclusion of hydrogenated vegetable oil is "necessary" because the only
substitute would be a saturated fat. Significantly, the FDA's interpreta-
tion of the standard may evade judicial review; as long as a court is
convinced that the standard is "sufficiently rational," it will not substi-
tute its own interpretation of the statutory language for the agency' s.154
Pesticide residue is governed by section 408 of the FD&C Act,
which provides that the burden of proof of safety lies with the pesticide
manufacturer, not with the FDA, to prove safety or lack thereof.1 5
Although the FDA is charged with regulating "poisonous" substances,
the EPA is the agency empowered to set tolerances for pesticide residues
on produce and regulate the safety of chemicals in food, once again pro-
viding statutory authority for the presence of some chemicals on pro-
duce.'5 6 As with the discussion above regarding the presence of added
substances in adulterated food, there is no statutory standard for what
constitutes a sufficient amount of pesticide to be "deleterious" to human
health. As Fortin notes:
The FD&C Act contains no provision that explicitly provides a regu-
latory mechanism for substances that become constituents of food
through environmental contamination. Many of these substances,
such as mercury, PCBs, aflatoxin, and PBBs, can pose serious risk to
public health. In part because the FD&C Act did not authorize FDA
to set tolerances for these contaminants, FDA began to set informal
section 406 "actions levels" . . . [which] are the highest level of con-
tamination that will not trigger FDA enforcement action.'
As previously discussed, the Delaney Clause of the FD&C Act estab-
lished a zero tolerance standard for the presence of carcinogenic pesti-
cides on food products."' After decades of being largely ignored by the
FDA and spurred by the controversial new technologies that allowed the
industry to more easily detect residues,' 5 9 Congress replaced the clause
with the more lenient Food Quality Protection Act in 1996, providing in
part:
154. See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986).
155. 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2006).
156. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 212; see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006)) and 21
U.S.C. § 346a (2006).
157. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 214.
158. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (current version
at 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)).
159. Congress began whittling away at the Clause by exempting saccharin from its restrictions.
FORTIN, supra note 3, at 221.
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As used in this section, the term "safe," with respect to a tolerance for
a pesticide chemical residue, means that the Administrator has deter-
mined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result
from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including
all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which
there is reliable information."6 o
Alarmingly, if the residue is deemed "necessary" to avoid a "significant
disruption" of the food supply, the tolerance passes muster under the
new statutory scheme.16 '
It is important to note that the FD&C Act's statutory grant of
authority to the FDA is extremely broad, yet the agency's budget has
never been set commensurate with the responsibilities granted to it under
the Act.162 Furthermore, courts have regularly upheld the FDA's discre-
tion to decline to take regulatory action against violations that it deems
are not "flagrant" enough to warrant the expenditure of resources.' To
make matters more complicated, the FDA does not have sole discretion
in choosing to bring enforcement actions, but must instead cooperate
with the Department of Justice." In order to exercise its power to seize
products and move for injunctions, the agency's attorneys must send
requests to Department of Justice attorneys, who can decline to litigate if
they so choose.165 Furthermore, the agency is often forced to litigate the
issue of jurisdiction since section 331 of the Act requires the "introduc-
tion into interstate commerce" of the product to trigger jurisdiction.166
Therefore, administrative enforcement most often comes in the form of
FDA warning letters, which are arguably largely ineffective. 167 Recalls
are voluntary, and manufacturers are not required to report them, though
the FDA requests to be notified.'16 Moreover, the FDA can recommend
a recall to a manufacturer, which then has discretion as to whether to
recall the product; if the product is not recalled, the FDA must com-
mence the costly litigation to seize the product.'69 Also, it is interesting
160. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(II) (2006).
162. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 498.
163. Id.; see also, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that the FDA's
discretion in enforcement actions are not subject to judicial review); Nat'l Milk Producers Fed'n
v. Harris, 653 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1981).
164. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 498
165. Id.
166. Id. at 499. This hurdle, however, is often overcome by use of a rebuttable presumption,
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 379a, that all FDA-regulated products have moved in interstate commerce.
Id. at 503.
167. Id. at 504-05.
168. See Iowa egg scare, supra notes 137, 140.
169. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 510-11. The few exceptions to the FDA's lack of authority to
order a recall do not apply to food, but do apply to infant formula only if it lacks the required
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to note that the FDA voluntarily declines to inspect or regulate restau-
rant sanitation, which is delegated to state and local governments but
does not fall under the umbrella category of federal food safety."o
D. Genetically Modified Food and European Tensions
Primary responsibility for regulating genetic engineering of plants
to promote resistance to insects, bacteria, and viruses lies with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. However, under its statutory authority to
regulate "adulterated food," or rather to ensure that the food supply
remains "unadulterated," the FDA established a policy on genetically
modified food in 1992: In much the same way as conventional food is
regulated, "FDA relies on companies developing GM foods to volunta-
rily notify the agency before marketing the foods."'II Such notification
triggers a two-part process at the end of which the company provides the
FDA with an internally produced safety assessment. Pursuant to the
information in that assessment, the agency then grants (or denies) the
company permission to market the product. 17 2 Genetically engineered
food, or food products that contain genetically modified ingredients, are
not required to be so labeled because the FDA "does not consider the
methods used to develop [genetic modification] . . . to be 'material'
within the meaning of 'misleading' in section 201(n) [of the] Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act"; nor does the agency automatically require
pre-market approval based on the sole fact of genetic modification. 3
The agency's position is that genetically modified food does not differ in
any significant or meaningful way from conventional food and does not
present any different or substantial safety risks."' Through an approach
called substantial equivalence, the FDA compares the attributes of new
genetically modified products to those of conventional products; if they
are "substantially equivalent," they are treated in the same way. Criti-
cally, the FDA does not consider the actual process used to create the
new product because it presumes that the process has no bearing on the
nutrients or is otherwise misbranded, but not necessarily if it is dangerous. Id. Other remedies,
rarely invoked in the context of food, include debarment (a total prohibition from importing
products) and import detentions. Id. at 511-12. Additionally, criminal prosecutions under strict
liability can be filed. Id. at 524-25; see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding
the CEO of a supermarket chain responsible for causing food adulteration regardless of whether
he had actual knowledge of the unsanitary conditions in the company's warehouses). The
Department of Justice may further indict violators under other provisions of title 18, such as
willful misconduct. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 533-34.
170. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 503.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 415. However, labeling may be required if the genetic modification significantly
changes what the consumer might expect the food to be. See Hearing, supra note 71.
174. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 416; see also GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 72.
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issue of safety.' 5
[T]he available tests do not guarantee absolute safety of GM foods,
but comparable safety. There is no assurance that even conventional
foods are completely safe . . . Because they have been consumed for
many years, though, conventional foods are used as the standard for
comparison in assessing the safety of GM foods[. '7 6
Some biotechnology experts argue that the agency's evaluation process
has inherent flaws and could be improved. Importantly, the agency
should independently verify the individual companies' test data regard-
ing genetically modified products; additionally, the communication
between the agency and the consuming public should be more open and
clear.' 77 The agency itself admits that the current regulatory scheme for
genetically modified food allows for the possibility that material that has
not been expressly regulated might "inadvertently enter the food supply"
before the FDA can approve it.17 8 Cross-pollination from field tests to
commercial fields results in the presence of unregulated material in the
food supply. 179 This means that the agency knows, or should know, of
the dangers inherent in the current system and of the reasonable possibil-
ity that an untested, unregulated food product could make consumers
sick. The possibility, of course, also exists that this same food product
will not make consumers sick, but the important point to note is that
neither the FDA, the food manufacturers, nor the consuming public
knows which possibility will prevail. Allowing this loophole with full
knowledge of the potential consequences is gambling with our health-
practically by definition culpable negligence to which strict liability
attaches.180
In comparison, Europeans view genetically modified food with
great caution.' 8 ' This attitude is largely derived from a history fraught
with atrocities in the name of genetic science. As a result, the Green
175. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 416.
176. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 72.
177. Id.; see also Jorgen Schlundt, Governance of Biotechnology: Emerging Regulation of GM
Crops and Livestock in Global Food Industries and Food Systems, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES 359 (Reba A. Carruth ed., 2006).
178. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 422.
179. Id. at 423.
180. See discussion supra p. 203.
181. A comprehensive review of European attitudes toward food and the resulting regulatory
schemes is beyond the scope of this comment; however, in the context of genetically modified
food a brief discussion of the intersection between European and American food markets is useful.
Furthermore, Japan has instituted a "zero tolerance" policy for genetically modified food products,
which it deems to be "contaminants." R. Michael Roberts, Genetically Modified Organisms for
Agricultural Food Production: The Extent of the Art and the State of the Science, in LABELING
GENETICALLY MODIFIED Fooo: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 10, 14 (Paul Weirich ed.,
2007).
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Parties of Europe, working largely with Greenpeace International, have
fought for a "better-safe-than-sorry" policy.18 2 Instead of viewing the
lack of conclusive evidence, largely due to the lack of scientific study, of
any adverse effects of genetic modification as proof that no such effects
exist, European advocates champion the idea that it's better to wait for
such evidence before allowing products into the food supply. Since the
United States has declined to follow Europe's lead, the European Com-
mission banned food imports containing genetically modified material
unless they are so labeled.' To make matters worse, Europeans have
largely lost trust in American food companies since the fatal outbreak of
"mad cow disease" coincided perfectly with the beginning of genetically
modified products being "slipped" into the American food supply as
well as American food products exported to Europe. This "quick switch"
method only served to heighten European fears about food safety,
allowing deep-seated historical mistrust and fundamental cultural differ-
ences to resurface. 18 4
Genetically modified food symbolizes the clash between American
and European cultures. It symbolizes European resistance to
encroaching American cultural hegemony over the planet. But while
Europeans can do little about American military might, or space
exploration, or finance, they know what they like to bring into their
kitchen. They know how they like to eat and where. They know they
don't want McCaf6s to replace the real ones, and they know they
don't want the American model of fast food to become the norm in
Europe. 85
The final compromise-referred to as the precautionary principle-
allows countries to ban imports of genetically modified food from the
United States merely based on concerns of the potential dangers of the
product.'86 This now leaves Americans alone in their tolerance of the
traditional reactive system; since no evidence excluding the possibility
of danger exists, genetically modified food remains in our food supply.
Consider, however, that there was once a time when there was no "evi-
dence" of contracting E.coli from eating a hamburger, but in hindsight it
would be foolish to extrapolate from that lack of evidence that the possi-
bility did not exist.
The American judiciary, the traditional forum for vindicating
American rights when the executive and legislative branches have failed
182. PENCE, supra note 4, at 9.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 10. "Americans eat garbage food, they're fat, and they don't know how to eat
properly." Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
185. Id. at 24.
186. Id. at 22.
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to do so, could arguably become a proving ground for opponents of
genetic modification to highlight the failures of the current regulatory
scheme. In theory, the federal judiciary has the power to shape regula-
tory policy and grant relief through remedies such as damages and
injunctions.18 7 Yet fundamental notions of separation of powers prohibit
the judiciary from doing much more than what the statutory scheme cur-
rently in place allows it to do. Further, it cannot act at all unless
presented with a ripe "case" or "controversy." 8 8 Most importantly, in
light of the comparative lack of litigation in proportion to food-related
illness and death in the context of traditional food, coupled with the
regulatory loopholes already in place, it is illogical to assume that the
federal judiciary will be able to overcome these same inherent hurdles in
the realm of genetically modified food.
IV. FOOD SAFETY LITIGATION
A. Public Litigation
Litigation due to failures of the American food safety regulation
system is not as prevalent as might initially be expected.
[Iln the area of foodborne illness, the vast majority of injuries never
reach trial. Foodborne pathogen determination requires expensive
investigation and laboratory testing. The chance of finding the causa-
tive agent (and responsible party) is slight. Fewer than one in ten
thousand foodborne illness cases are litigated and even fewer are paid
compensation. For every million acute foodborne illnesses, approxi-
mately [ten] to [forty-five] torts ensue. Put another way, out of 76
million serious foodborne illness cases annually in the United States,
roughly 75,996,000 victims lack recourse to tort remedies. 89
Much of the litigation that does occur involves condemnation proceed-
ings pursuant to the authority of the FDA, in concert with the Depart-
ment of Justice, under the FD&C Act. Seizures, authorized in section
334 of the FD&C Act,190 require fewer resources than injunctions and
criminal prosecutions and can often be effectuated fairly quickly. How-
ever, it still requires that the FDA district recommend a seizure action to
FDA headquarters, where the recommendation goes through multiple
levels of review before final legal review by the Office of General Coun-
sel. If the recommendation passes review, it is then transmitted back to
the FDA district, which then must seek Department of Justice approval
187. Blake Denton, Regulating the Regulators: The Increased Role for the Federal Judiciary
in Monitoring the Debate over Genetically Modified Crops, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 333,
369 (2007).
188. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
189. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 606.
190. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2006).
6972011]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
pursuant to which the U.S. Attorney files a complaint on behalf of the
agency.191 Seizure and condemnation proceedings, still generally
restricted to only the most flagrant of violations despite their relative
"ease," do not proceed in tort and do not end with damages judgments.
Instead, defendants found guilty of violating the Act usually face recalls
and condemnation of the product, or in very severe cases refusal to pro-
vide inspection services for producers found to be unfit to be in busi-
ness, though this usually requires a finding of multiple violations. 192 In
such proceedings, the government bears the burden of proof of adultera-
tion, subject to the language loopholes inherent in the statutory scheme
discussed above. 193 However, food manufacturers, and the chief corpo-
rate officer if named individually, have the ability to assert affirmative
defenses in such suits-for example, that he or she was powerless to
prevent the violation of which the company is accused.' 94 The defense
seems grounded in, and indeed approved by, the statutory language of
inevitable contamination. For example, a defendant charged with adul-
teration is able to argue that he exercised "extraordinary care" and yet
still could not prevent violations of the Act; such a defense would then
place an additional burden on the government to overcome evidence of
extraordinary care beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 5
Food sold by restaurants is governed almost entirely outside the
realm of the FD&C Act, regulated instead by the implied warranty of
merchantability of the Uniform Commercial Code.196 Essentially,
because the serving of food is a sale, a warranty that the food is whole-
some and fit for consumption attaches;' 9 the test for whether food is fit
for consumption includes not only freedom from foreign or deleterious
substances, but also freedom from any substance not reasonably to be
expected by the consumer in the food served.198 Accordingly, restaurant
patrons who find spiders in their soup or get sick after eating spoiled
food may sue under breach of warranty following Uniform Commercial
Code standards, but have no recourse under food safety regulation.199
191. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 514.
192. 21 U.S.C. § 671 (2006).
193. 35A AM. JUR. 2D Food § 72 (2010).
194. Id.
195. United States v. New Eng. Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1980).
196. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2003).
197. See, e.g., Wachtel v. Rosol, 271 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1970); Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Rest.,
Inc., 272 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1971); Ray v. Deas, 144 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965); Koster v.
Scotch Assocs., 640 A.2d 1225 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Levy v. Paul, 147 S.E.2d 722
(Va. 1966).
198. See, e.g., Hochberg, 272 A.2d at 848-49.
199. Compare 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 716 (2009) (discussing Wernick v. Bob
Ware's Food Shops, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Dec. 19 (finding breach of warranty by the presence of a
date pit in a muffin)) with Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964)
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B. Private Litigation
Private suits brought against food providers or manufacturers gen-
erally claim negligence in the contexts of a breach of duty of care, not
dissimilar from products liability tort litigation, strict liability, and
breach of warranty.
Products liability theories provide three main causes of action in
which liability might apply to a manufacturer or distributor of an
FDA-regulated product plus a fourth related theory of liability: (1)
strict liability, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) negligence, and (4)
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. . . . Misrepresentation or nondis-
closure causes of action may arise with FDA-regulated products
either from the premise that the manufacturer concealed material
information from the FDA during the agency's review, or from alle-
gation of misrepresentation or nondisclosure to the consumer. Of
these causes of action, strict liability and breach of implied warranty
are the primary theories of recovery.
Courts are fairly divided as to what may constitute prima facie evidence
of negligence in such cases: Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and
New Jersey have found that illness or injury following ingestion estab-
lishes a prima facie case,20 1 while Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington have
not.2 0 2 Interestingly, California courts have found both ways. 203 Logi-
cally, however, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant wherever the
same asserts an affirmative defense, such as tampering.2 " In the current
absence of effective regulation, "private . .. litigation can influence food
policy, leading to changes in the conduct of food manufacturers .... "2 05
(finding no breach of warranty by the presence of fish bones in New England fish chowder that
became lodged in plaintiffs throat); see also U.C.C. § 2-314 (2001).
200. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 607.
201. See H.J. Heinz Co. v. Fortson, 8 S.E.2d 443 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940); Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382 (Iowa 1920); Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 56 So. 906 (La. 1911);
Wilson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 65 A.2d 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949); Rosenbusch v.
Ambrosia Milk Corp., 168 N.Y.S. 505 (App. Div. 1917).
202. See McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 153 So. 446 (Ala. 1934); China Doll Rest., Inc. v.
MacDonald, 180 A.2d 503 (D.C. 1962); Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 519 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Crocker v. Balt. Dairy Lunch Co., 100 N.E. 1078 (Mass. 1913); Goodwin v.
Misticos, 42 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 1949) (en banc); Lamb v. Boyles, 135 S.E. 464 (N.C. 1926); Bell
v. Bowers Stores, Inc., 3 Tenn. App. 590 (Ct. App. 1926); Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 132
P.2d 740 (Wash. 1942).
203. Compare Reese v. Smith, 70 P.2d 933 (Cal. 1937) (finding evidence insufficient to
establish prima facie case of negligence where plaintiff was diagnosed with botulism after eating
pork sausage found to contain maggots) with Dougherty v. Lee, 168 P.2d 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)
(finding evidence sufficient to establish prima facie case of negligence where plaintiffs cows had
no access to food but defendant's hay and died within twenty-four hours after eating it).
204. See, e.g., Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
205. Rothenberg, supra note 45, at 186. At least one lawsuit has already been filed in
connection with the salmonella outbreak leading to a massive egg recall by producers in Iowa.
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1. IMPLIED WARRANTY
One theory under which plaintiffs may bring food safety claims is
implied warranty. The Uniform Commercial Code provides three alter-
natives for states to choose from in determining who may benefit from
such a warranty.206 The first alternative protects anyone pertaining to the
family or household of the buyer or any guest in the home of the buyer
provided that it is reasonable to expect that such person would use, con-
sume, or be affected by the product in question.2 07 The second and third
alternatives protect anyone at all who "may reasonably be expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach
of the warranty." 208 The sole difference between the two latter alterna-
tives is in the omission of the word "natural" to qualify "person" in the
third alternative; consequently the third alternative provides that, "a
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect
to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty
extends." 209 For purposes of food safety litigation, therefore, an express
or implied warranty regarding the safety or wholesomeness of a food
product extends beyond the immediate buyer that enters into a contract
with the seller, depending on a particular state's choice of statutory
alternative. 2 10
The concept of an implied warranty on the part of a food producer
or seller is not a new one. In the early 1900s, courts recognized that the
common law implies a warranty of wholesomeness on a retail sale of
food.2 1 1 This rule of implied warranty "has its ethical basis in the rea-
sonable presumption that the vendor, if a regular retail dealer, and espe-
cially if he be also the manufacturer, has the better means of knowledge
of the character of the food which he offers for sale."2 12 The Supreme
Court of Washington held that public policy demanded a finding of
breach of implied warranty in a case where the plaintiff purchased dried
beef prepared and sold by the defendant and soon after became violently
ill, suffering permanent damage to his digestive system.2 1 3 This demand
is due to the fact that "the consequences resulting from the purchase of
an unsound article may be so serious and may prove so disastrous to the
See Wright County Egg Recall: Lawyer for Salmonella Investigation and Lawsuit, PRTZKER
OLsEN, P.A., http://www.pritzkerlaw.com/salmonella/wright-county-egg-salmonella.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2011).




210. See also U.C.C. §§ 2-313A(1) to B(1) (2003).
211. Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 160 P. 14, 16 (Wash. 1916).
212. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 14-15.
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health and life of the consumer." 2 14 Similarly, Iowa courts have found
that privity of contract is not a necessary condition to finding a canned
food manufacturer in breach of implied warranty of wholesomeness.2 15
Significantly, however, the Iowa Supreme Court found no express war-
ranty where a can of pork and beans had a label stating that the meat had
been federally inspected and was sanitary.216 Nevertheless, the plaintiff,
who had suffered ptomaine poisoning, was granted a new trial because
the proof of injury was sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether the
manufacturer had breached the implied warranty of wholesomeness.217
Not only does such an implied warranty extend to the "immediate
buyer,"218 such as a grocer, but also extends to the "ultimate consumer"
who purchases the product from the grocer.219 One Ohio court found a
bakery company in breach of implied warranty after a consumer pur-
chased a cake from a retail grocer and was injured as a result of a needle
he ingested while eating it. 2 2 0 Interestingly, the court also recognized
that the mental suffering of the plaintiff could properly be considered by
the jury in determining damages.22'
In contrast, a North Carolina court found no liability under breach
of implied warranty where the plaintiff did not purchase the defective
soft drink in question directly from the bottler, but from a lunch room.22 2
Even though the court recognized that manufacturers of food-and bot-
tlers of beverages-have a high duty of care to the consumer and
impliedly warrant that their products are fit for human consumption, it
declined to find such a warranty beyond the parties to the contract for
sale.223 Furthermore, a Louisiana court declined to impose liability on a
seller where no evidence was presented to show that the product defect
was known or should have been known 22 4 -juxtaposing negligence
analysis onto an action for breach of implied warranty. That court effec-
tively foreclosed any claim under a theory of implied warranty and
placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the food was deleterious
214. Id. at 17.
215. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382 (Iowa 1920).
216. Id. at 387.
217. Id. at 392.
218. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (2008).
219. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557, 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928). This theory seems
to foreshadow the later statutorily enacted alternatives regarding the scope of implied warranty.
See U.C.C. § 2-318 (2008).
220. Trizzino, 161 N.E. at 558.
221. Id. at 560.
222. Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 138 S.E.2d 753, 754 (N.C. 1964) (action for
injuries due to the presence of a green fly in a soft drink).
223. Id. at 753.
224. McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., Inc., 202 So. 2d 492, 497 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
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and that his illness resulted therefrom;22 5 the plaintiff had suffered an
acute attack of gastroenteritis approximately two hours after consuming
a hot sausage sandwich.2 26 Significantly, under the court's analysis lia-
bility would not be foreclosed under a theory of negligence, nor would
the plaintiff be unable to bring a warranty claim against the manufac-
turer of the sandwich.
2. STRICT LIABILITY
A prima facie case of strict liability can be established by proof that
the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the offending prod-
uct, the product consumed was defective and "unreasonably" dangerous,
the defective and dangerous nature of the product was already present
when it left the defendant's control, and consumption of the product
caused the plaintiff physical harm. 2 27 No contractual relationship need
be proved, nor does the plaintiff have to establish that the defendant
failed to exercise all possible care.2 28 What, exactly, constitutes an
"unreasonable" amount of danger? This implies once again that there is
a level of danger inherent in defective food that is generally acceptable
and not subject to tort liability. "Unreasonably dangerous" can be con-
strued to mean "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer .... ."229 Assumption of risk is a
viable defense to strict liability in this context, 230 allowing producers to
wiggle out of claims by, for example, labeling their product with infor-
mation such as trans fat content or risk of foreign objects or substances
(like olive pits). 23 1 Indeed, since much of this labeling is statutorily man-
dated, isn't our regulatory scheme virtually giving producers an implicit
way out of liability?
In the strict liability context, food litigation can be successfully
analogized to other forms of products liability litigation. Despite the fact
that food is explicitly excluded from the Consumer Product Safety
Act,232 there is increasing recognition of liability in that context. The
225. Id. at 495-96. It was significant for the court that the product had been prepackaged but
not sealed. Id. at 494.
226. Id. at 493.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
228. Cause of Action for Physical Harm Caused by Eating or Drinking Dangerous or
Contaminated Food or Beverage, 4 CAUSES OF ACTION 787 (2010).
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. i (1965); see also Matthews v. Campbell
Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
230. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 607.
231. See, e.g., Kolarik v. Cory Int'l Corp., 721 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 2006) (holding that use of
the words "minced pimento stuffed" on jar label could not be construed as express warranty that
olives had been pitted).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(I) (2006); see also Abernathy v. Schenly Indus., Inc., 420 F.Supp.
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Third Restatement of Torts indicates:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing food
products who sells or distributes a food product that is defective . . .
is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect.. . . [A] harm-causing ingredient of the food product consti-
tutes a defect if a reasonable consumer would not expect the food
product to contain that ingredient.2 33
This view, though contrary to the broad Consumer Product Safety Act,
explicitly recognizes that liability for harm caused by defects in food
products can and should be determined under the same rules as non-food
products.23 4 Liability for breaches of food safety under a products liabil-
ity analysis does contain an inherent problem-unlike other types of
"products," food products "do not have specific product designs that
may be used as a basis for determining whether the offending product
ingredient constitutes a departure from design" to which liability may
attach.23 5 Most relevant to analyzing food safety problems under the
FD&C Act, a product's noncompliance with a product safety statute ren-
ders the product "defective" for purposes of products liability claims,2 36
but a product's compliance with the same type of statute or administra-
tive regulation "is properly considered in determining whether the prod-
uct is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation . . . ."237 Therefore, a presumption is created that
allows food producers to escape liability through one of the many loop-
holes inherent in the current statutory scheme.2 3 8 In essence, "[w]hen a
court concludes that the defendant is not liable by reason of having com-
plied with a safety design or warnings statute or regulation, it is deciding
that the product in question is not defective as a matter of the law of that
state."2 39 Courts, not surprisingly, are divided on how much weight
compliance with a relevant statute should be given.24 0 Significantly,
I (W.D.N.C. 1976) (precluding a suit for wrongful death from acute ethanol poisoning because
alcoholic beverage is "food" within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act).
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 7 (1998) (emphasis added).
234. Id. cmt. a.
235. Id. cmt. b.
236. Id. § 4(a).
237. Id. § 4(b). However, such compliance does not preclude the finding of a product defect.
Id.
238. See discussion supra pp. 215-16, 220-26.
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. e (1998) ("Thus, most product
safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of safety below which product sellers fall only at
their peril, but they leave open the question of whether a higher standard of product safety should
be applied.").
240. See, e.g., Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., Inc. 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. App. 1994) (finding a
presumption of nondefectiveness in the event of compliance with safety regulations); Sim v.
Washex Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding that compliance with
government regulations is "strong evidence" of a lack of defect); Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591
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such analysis has not been undertaken in the specific context of food
safety. However, the attention given to similar analysis-governed by
the same statute-is significantly greater in the context of drug safety.2 4 1
It is illustrative to examine traditional products liability cases to see
the analogy to food safety. Generally, a plaintiff claiming strict products
liability must prove that the product was unsafe for its "intended
user."2 42 "A product will be deemed defective only if it left the sup-
plier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the
intended use."2 4 3 Most importantly, the privity-of-contract analysis
sometimes used in implied warranty cases, as well as the foreseeability
and reasonableness concepts of negligence, have no place in a products
liability case based on strict liability. 244 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, ultimately declined to find strict
liability against a manufacturer and distributors of disposable butane
cigarette lighters based on a design defect; although the lighters did not
have any sort of child-resistant features, the court held that the two-year-
old child who had started a fire with the lighter was not an intended user
of the product.2 4 5 The court did, however, find that under a theory of
negligence summary judgment was precluded because an issue of fact
remained as to whether the manufacturer owed a duty of care to equip
the lighters with child-resistant features.246 This would seem paradoxical
since such a duty analysis essentially would require the jury to deter-
mine whether use by a two-year-old child is reasonably foreseeable,
which in essence becomes an analysis of whether a two-year-old child
might be an intended user (despite the fact that the manufacturer may not
actively intend for the child to use the lighter). The court emphasized,
however, the need to keep strict liability and negligence concepts sepa-
rate when determining liability, stating that "[s]trict liability focuses
solely on the product, and is divorced from the conduct of the manufac-
turer."2 47 The fact that the court's refusal to extend liability turned on
S.W.2d 907, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that a pre-approved package insert warning did
not relieve the drug company of its obligation to properly warn consumers); Wash. State
Physicians Ins. Exch. & Assoc. v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1069 (Wash. 1993) (finding that
evidence of compliance with FDA regulations does not automatically relieve a drug manufacturer
of liability).
241. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998).
242. Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa. 2003).
243. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also text supra p. 220 (discussing FD&C Act
"intended use" analysis).
244. Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1005-06.
245. Id. at 1007-08.
246. Id. at 1009-10.
247. Id. at 1007.
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whether a two-year-old child can be properly considered an intended
user of a butane lighter is significant to the analysis of food safety litiga-
tion. Where can a court draw the line between which consumers are
"intended users" of certain food products and which are not? This once
again brings attention to a statutory flaw-the FD&C Act grants the
FDA authority to work with food producers to set tolerances of, essen-
tially, product defects. Yet the human body tolerance of poisonous and
deleterious substances varies by age, weight, and gender. Every con-
sumer must be considered an "intended user" of food. This presents one
of the strongest arguments for continuing to extend the requisite duty of
care of food producers to the highest level-if a food producers'
"intended user" is essentially every American citizen, the standard to
which they are held must be significantly higher than traditional product
manufacturers.
Recent cases have emphasized that the policy rationale behind
imposing such strict liability on manufacturers of "defective products" is
that "where a manufacturer places a defective and unreasonably danger-
ous product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer, not the
injured consumer, should bear the costs of the risks posed by the prod-
uct."248 Since foreseeability of risk plays no part in the analysis, a manu-
facturer can be found liable regardless of whether there was any
knowledge, or possibility of knowledge, of the risk of harm its product
presented to consumers. 249 The plaintiff, therefore, need only prove that
the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.250 Significantly,
recent court decisions have focused on the Second Restatement of Torts'
consumer-contemplation test for determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous, holding that a product can be found defective
and unreasonably dangerous solely based on consumer expectations of
the product.251 This standard is entirely consumer-centric, defining
"defect" as a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer and
"unreasonably dangerous" as dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.252 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin explained in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.:
This does not mean, however, that to prevail on a strict products lia-
bility claim, an injured consumer must prove that the product at issue
is potentially dangerous to every consumer. Because product defects
248. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 752 (Wis. 2001).
249. Id. at 750-51.
250. Id. at 752.
251. Id. at 741-42. The court explicitly found the consumer-contemplation test to be
appropriate in cases involving complex products. Id. at 742. The way in which our food is
produced can only be described as complex. See discussion supra pp. 206-08.
252. Id. at 752-53.
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vary, the magnitude of danger necessary to render a product danger-
ous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer-i.e., unreasonably dangerous-must be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis. 253
The Green court rejected the older "danger-utility" test approach, which
found a product to be defective as designed "if, but only if, the magni-
tude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." 2 54
The court found the manufacturer of latex gloves strictly liable for
injuries resulting from an allergic reaction exclusively on the grounds
that the gloves were unreasonably dangerous because the ordinary con-
sumer would not be aware that they could cause an allergic reaction in
five to seventeen percent of consumers. 255 The gloves in question had
harmful proteins that naturally occur in the latex, but the manufacturer
could have significantly reduced the protein levels by changing the man-
ufacturing process.2 5 6 In the Green case, the allergic reaction dispropor-
tionately affected members of the plaintiffs profession,2 5 7 whereas food
safety breakdowns affect every single consumer. Significantly, "[i]f the
average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition
of the product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it would
not be unreasonably dangerous and defective."258 No reasonable con-
sumer would wear latex gloves that he or she knew would lead to a
severe allergic reaction; no reasonable consumer would eat food that he
or she knew would make them sick or obese. Because we rely exclu-
sively on food producers and retail grocers for our food supply, a higher
duty of care attaches and we cannot "fully appreciate the attendant risks"
involved; consumers have a reasonable expectation that their food will
not make them sick, either in the long term or short term, making a
virtually iron-clad case for imposing strict liability on food producers
who place deleterious products into the stream of commerce.
3. NEGLIGENCE
Negligence, as opposed to strict liability, is used less often because
it requires a higher burden of proof-duty of care and foreseeability. In
fact, factors that may be considered favorable to proving that reasonable
care was exercised include current industry standards, current state of
the technology and knowledge, and compliance with government regula-
253. Id. at 754. This seems to be a workable standard in light of the inherent differences
between each human body. See discussion supra p. 236.
254. Id. at 740 (internal citations omitted).
255. Id. at 754-55.
256. Id. at 732-33.
257. Id. at 733.
258. Id. at 739 (internal quotations omitted).
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tions. 2 5 9 In other words, we have created a regulatory catch-22: The reg-
ulations by which producers must abide are rife with ambiguities and
loopholes, yet as long as they can prove they did not run afoul of those
regulations, courts won't find them negligent. If "everyone else is doing
it," so, too, can producers. We have a regulatory scheme in place that
admittedly allows violations to fall through the cracks, yet the judiciary
does not provide a remedy to consumers in the form of a more secure
safety net for damages.
Despite this loophole, under the standard framework of negligence
food producers should routinely be found liable. We, as consumers, have
no choice but to purchase our food through a food retailer, which in turn
has no choice but to do business with food producers; gone is the era of
family farms and self-sufficiency. In an ironic sense, food producers
have a veritable monopoly on the food we eat-as "the only game in
town," producers have an inherent duty of care to consumers. Histori-
cally, this duty has been well recognized by courts in the context of food
safety but is notably absent from modern jurisprudence. As early as the
beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of Washington
recognized that in the context of food the duty-of-care standard is much
higher than in the context of other products because even slight negli-
gence can result in "fearful consequences."260 In the context of canned
food, courts have held that producers must "exercise the highest degree
of care to see that such food is wholesome."26' Ohio courts have framed
such a high duty of care as a demand of public policy.262 Courts in Mas-
sachusetts have recognized the serious and extreme consequences to
human life that are likely to result from food producers' negligence.263
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has gone so far as to hold all produc-
ers of food products to "the highest degree of care," citing public interest
as the driving force behind such a policy.'
Foreseeability likewise should not be a barrier to consumer vindica-
tion, though it has been more difficult to prove in the context of food.
259. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 609.
260. Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 160 P. 14, 16 (Wash. 1916) (finding liability in an
action for damages as a result of eating diseased dried beef).
261. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382, 387 (Iowa 1920) (finding proof of injury
as prima facie case of negligence where plaintiff had no knowledge of the degree of care used).
262. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino 161 N.E. 557, 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) ("Considerations of
public policy demand that the utmost care and caution be exacted from the manufacturer of
articles of food . . . .").
263. Flynn v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 6 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Mass. 1937) (action for negligence as
a result of selling a pound of "hamburg steak" containing small pieces of wire).
264. Jones v. Mercer Pie Co., 214 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tenn. 1948) (emphasis added) (finding
liability against a bakery for sale of pie contaminated due to unsanitary conditions where pies
were purchased from a retailer, not from the bakery).
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"[S]cienter is presumed as a matter of law, especially where . . . the
vendor for immediate consumption is not only the dealer, but also the
manufacturer."2 65 In a case where a frankfurter containing a particle of
wire was in the exclusive control of the manufacturer before being pur-
chased by the consumer, the manufacturer was held liable under a theory
of negligence without the necessity of showing any "particular derelic-
tion of the manufacturer." 266 In an analogous way, although modern
food passes through a complex chain of commerce, much of it is sealed
by the manufacturer and any bacterial contamination or other deleterious
condition can be attributed to the producer. Pennsylvania courts have
recognized that manufacturers are liable "due to that uncertain human
quality-carelessness somewhere along the line," even where the most
up-to-date methods are used to eliminate injurious substances in our
food.26 7 Similarly, a Massachusetts court found an inference of negli-
gence where a "hamburg steak" sold to the plaintiff contained small
pieces of wire, and evidence suggested that the wire did not get into the
steak after leaving the store.2 6 8 One Tennessee court held:
There must be more than a mere probability that the defendant was
negligent. But the plaintiff is not bound to exclude the possibility that
the accident might have happened from some other cause than that
alleged.... The facts must tend to exclude any other cause, but the
inference of exclusion of any other cause than that alleged need not
be urged beyond mere doubt . ... 269
Historically, courts have relied on a "foreign-natural" test to determine
negligence, drawing a distinction between the "foreign" and "natural"
characteristics of a food product.27 0 "[If an object or substance in a food
product is natural to any of the ingredients of the product, there is no
liability for injuries caused . . . ."271 Not unlike the Green case, recent
cases have rejected this test because the distinction cannot be determina-
tive of what is harmful for human consumption.2 72 By utilizing a reason-
able expectation test, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Schafer v. JLC
Food Systems, Inc. addressed the issue of foreseeability: "The defendant
has the duty of ordinary care to eliminate or remove in the preparation of
the food served such harmful substance as the consumer of the food, as
265. Flessher, 160 P. at 17.
266. Newcomb v. Armour, 39 F. Supp. 716, 720 (M.D. Pa. 1941).
267. Id.
268. Flynn, 6 N.E.2d at 814.
269. Jones, 214 S.W.2d at 49 (quotation marks omitted) (finding evidence sufficient for jury to
conclude that evidence of unsanitary conditions at bakery proved negligence where two
consumers were made ill by contaminated pies).
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served, would not ordinarily anticipate and guard against."2 73 The Scha-
fer court found that a prima facie case of negligence had been made
where a restaurant customer sued after injuring her throat by eating a
defective pumpkin muffin.2 74 Significantly, the court found that circum-
stantial evidence of the harmful substance was sufficient to preclude
summary judgment; it was impossible to identify with complete cer-
tainty the exact nature of the harmful substance in the muffin, yet the
question presented was one for a jury to decide.27 5
Negligence per se, rarely invoked in food safety litigation, allows
plaintiffs to assert liability merely for violation of a statute, arguing that
such violation constitutes the requisite breach of care.276 Some states do
not apply negligence per se, and the states that do often do not apply it
uniformly: "The guiding principle in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of negligence per se is whether its application is necessary to
effectuate the legislative purpose."2 77 Fortin explains:
In some states, violation of a statute is merely a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence, and violation of a regulation is merely evidence of
negligence. When violation of a statute designed for the protection of
human life or property does not constitute negligence per se but is
only prima facie evidence of negligence, the presumption may be
rebutted by proof that the defendant acted reasonably under the cir-
cumstances, despite the violation.278
Though the application of negligence per se seems obvious in the con-
text of a consumer suit against a producer, the "rebuttable presumption"
has also been used in suits between producers.
Jurisdictions not willing to find a prima facie case upon mere proof
of injury find important policy implications in doing so, since it would
inherently make the seller of food an insurer of its product. 2 79 The mere
phrase "insurer of its product" seems to suffice for these courts, without
further explanation of why such insurance is undesirable for society. A
flood of litigation or the risk of a highly publicized media war seems
unlikely:
It is important to understand that the U.S. legal system is designed to
toss frivolous lawsuits long before they reach trial. In addition the
system allows judges to reduce excessive verdicts. In the [McDon-
ald's] hot coffee case, for example, the judge reduced the $2.9 mil-
273. Id. at 575 ("The majority of jurisdictions that have dealt with the defective food products
issue have adopted some formulation of the reasonable expectation test.").
274. Id. at 572.
275. Id. at 577-78.
276. FORTIN, supra note 3, at 621.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 625.
279. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Misticos, 42 So. 2d 397, 399 (Miss. 1949) (en banc).
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lion verdict by two-thirds to $640,000, and the parties reportedly
settled out of court for less than $600,000.280
In essence, at least in those jurisdictions, the FD&C Act provides the
floor below which no producer can go-you shouldn't, in theory, open a
box of cereal and find a whole cockroach inside-and the courts provide
the ceiling above which no producer need go. The message to the Amer-
ican consumer is clear: We statutorily accept that there will be violations
that won't be prosecuted and that some contamination is inevitable, and
we do not judicially require that producers insure their product for
safety. From a policy standpoint, the right answer seems to be entirely to
the contrary: Requiring such insurance would force food producers to be
more internally vigilant about the quality of the food under their control
(excluding some breach by grocery store negligence, for example)
because the cost of potential litigation would be just too high. The pro-
ducers' cost-benefit analysis would be inverted because in the event of a
claim against them, the options would be limited to settlement or an
uphill evidentiary battle. One possible way in which producers could
perform better quality control as a result would be simply to have more
employees performing inspections, creating jobs that require relatively
no skilled training-an attractive incentive in today's hostile recession
job market. In the long run, less litigation means that fewer potential
plaintiffs are getting sick, proportionately decreasing soaring healthcare
costs.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be no question that "food safety is an important regula-
tory responsibility"281 that demands reform. Some believe that meaning-
ful change cannot come without significant changes in government
regulation.282 In response to calls for reform, the FDA has continued to
implement new regulatory structures, adding more confusion to the
chaos of the existing scheme. The new Hazards Analysis and Critical
Control Points ("HACCP") require producers to identify potential risks
at all stages of food processing.28 3 Once the producer has self-identified
a critical control point ("CCP"), it must establish a minimum value at
280. FORTM, supra note 3, at 606. Of course, it is unclear why such a media war would be a
bad consequence of litigation, particularly if the resulting pressure forces producers to put out a
better quality product.
281. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'v REV. 691, 696 (2003).
282. Rothenberg, supra note 45 (discussing the context of fighting the obesity epidemic).
283. Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/HazardAnalysisCriticalControl
PointsHACCP/HACCPPrinciplesApplicationGuidelines/default.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
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which the hazard can be controlled or eliminated.28 4 In keeping with the
tradition of flawed self-regulation, producers need not get government
pre-approval for their HACCP plans, and the FDA guidelines provide
broad discretion to producers in managing their own food safety risks.2 85
Government inspectors rely on the records given them by the producers,
who "have little reason not to falsify records, particularly in the absence
of whistleblower protections or other incentives for someone knowl-
edgeable to verify what went on in the production line."2 86 Since reme-
dying hazardous problems is often costly, if the inspectors are unlikely
to find the problem themselves producers are reluctant to bring it to their
attention.2 87 In fact, it is becoming clear that many food producers are
still not in compliance with the HACCP rule.2 88 Government inspections
to ensure compliance have only occurred in 1% of plants subject to
inspection, and of that 1%, 94% had significant violations of the require-
ments and 89% had incomplete hazard analyses.2 89 One possible solu-
tion to the failure of the HACCP guidelines is third-party auditing. This
has several potential advantages:
First, Lit] may create incentives for the inspections themselves to be
as efficient as possible. Second, if there are economies of scale in
understanding the relevant management systems, third-party certifiers
specializing in different types of facilities or processes may better
capture those scale effects. Finally, third-party auditing can help off-
set or augment the limited resources of government regulators.290
One pair of authors has suggested that even voluntary auditing is a step
in the right direction: Producers' choice about whether to be audited
sends a message about the risky nature of their product, allowing the
agency to allocate inspection resources to the higher risk producers who
choose not to be audited.29 '
Consider now the various pieces of the puzzle: a flawed, chaotic
regulatory scheme, whose constant patchwork amendments have not
ensured compliance or safety; judicial remedies that are not often
sought, and when they are, may fail due to statutory compliance; and a
theory that third-party auditing of inspections-even if voluntary-may
effect change. Third-party auditing would be just that-audits of the
284. Id.
285. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 279, at 698. "The rules direct firms to choose for
themselves what limits to set on the CCP and what internal procedures and technologies they
deploy." Id.
286. Id. at 721-22 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
287. Id. at 722.
288. Id. at 722-23.
289. Id. at 723.
290. Id. at 718.
291. Id.
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inspections the appropriate regulatory agency should be undertaking.
Inherent in such a scheme would either be a lack of uniformity-
because not every plant subject to inspection would necessarily be
audited all the time-or merely another layer in the already complex
failure of regulation. Moreover, it is unclear what remedies would be
available against a producer who fails an audit. For that matter, would a
producer have to fail multiple audits in order to trigger a remedy-and if
so, how many? This additional layer of regulation, which would overlap
with that already in place, would not ensure compliance but create more,
albeit possibly smaller, cracks through which producers' transgressions
might fall. Significantly, such third-party auditing may merely be an
inspection for statutory compliance-and certainly any sort of self-risk
analysis (such as that required by the HAACP) is destined to allow for
degrees of failure.
An essential issue is once again highlighted: Food producers are
proverbially getting away with murder."' There simply is no threat of
punishment or bottom-line pain that exists for deterrence purposes. As
one duo of authors posited in the case of obesity, under the status quo
the courts provide the only solution.29 3 Food producers may be in the
business of producing food, but quarterly profits drive their business
models. 29 4 In the face of regulatory failure, the only way for producers
to "feel it" in their bottom line is to be hailed into court to answer finan-
cially for their decisions and consequent actions. The framework has
already been put in place: Courts have already recognized that food pro-
ducers owe an even higher duty of care to consumers than other
merchants-a duty of care that, arguably, could be assigned to the gov-
ernment when analyzing its flawed regulatory scheme. In any given case
based on a failure of food safety, a producer can be found independently
liable on three theories: implied warranty of merchantability, strict lia-
bility, and negligence. The essential nature of the product-food-
demands the kind of harsh punishment strict liability imposes. Food that
causes life-threatening obesity or illness is unreasonably dangerous in a
way beyond that contemplated by traditional products liability; unlike a
lighter, an automobile, or a microwave, food is a product that we cannot
292. To add insult to injury, in some states food producers have the right to sue anyone they
allege has made disparaging statements or promulgated false information about the safety of their
product. Michael E. Rosman, Challenges to State Anti-Preference Laws and the Role of Federal
Courts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 709, 762 ("Those who wish to comment about the safety of
food products in those states are taking their chances that they could be sued in state court . . . .").
However, the outcome of at least one high-profile case suggests that such a suit may not always be
successful. See Tex. Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
293. See discussion supra pp. 212-13.
294. See discussion supra p. 210.
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live without.295 It can hardly be seriously argued that producers do not
know, or should not know, of the potential dangers of their products-
particularly in the context of obesity-inducing food and in the face of a
statutory scheme that not only highlights dangers, but actually permits
them. There is no difference between a frozen or fried meal that leads to
diabetes or a lot of ground beef rife with E.coli and a hamburger with a
piece of wire in it.29 6 The courtroom door, as the gateway to justice,
cannot close; the foundation is laid and waits only for consumers to take
action.
Real change, however, demands a significant rethinking about the
way we approach food. A large number of food safety-related recalls
and "whistle blows" about the relative safety of food products seem to
come from the state of Minnesota.297 It is perhaps sheer coincidence that
Minnesota is also home to the esteemed Mayo Clinic, the veritable gold
standard for medical care facilities. Another possible impetus for these
"whistle blows" is the implementation of a program called "Safe or
Sorry," a curriculum taught by the Minnesota Department of State in key
locations throughout the state covering a range of topics, including food-
borne illnesses, cross-contamination, and food irradiation.2 98 Further-
more, the state department has individualized divisions dedicated solely
to a particular health topic and, most notably for the purposes of this
comment, a specific office of food safety. 29 9 Finally, the State of Minne-
sota has enacted a Food Code, establishing policies and procedures for
food safety that are often more stringent than the federal guidelines.0 It
would be unrealistic to ignore the obvious fact that state governments
often have vastly more resources than the federal government to support
these kinds of programs, but that doesn't mean we can't learn something
from Minnesota. By highlighting the importance of food safety and, sig-
295. Two professors at Stanford Law School recently argued that the costs associated with
products liability litigation outweigh its benefits, particularly since market forces are likely to
produce similar or identical benefits. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for
Products Liability, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1437 (2010). However, it is significant to note that their
analysis did not extend to products of such magnitude of importance to human life as food and
instead constrained their argument to traditional products-such as drugs and automobiles. See
also discussion infra p. 246 (analyzing the inherently different nature of food from other types of
products).
296. See supra notes 261, 266 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Stephen J. Hedges, Food Safety Lacks Teeth, Critics Say Recalls Underscore
Gaps in Oversight, Cm. TRIB., July 16, 2007, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2007/jul/16/
food/chi-recall-hedges_16jul16.
298. What is Safe or Sorry (SOS)?, MINN. DEP'T OF HEATH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/
foodsafety/sos/basics.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
299. Food Safety, MINN. DEP'T OF HEATH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/foodsafety/index.
html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
300. MINN. R. 4626.0010-.1870 (2010).
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nificantly, affording proportional funding to its health department to pro-
mote safe food practices, Minnesota sends a clear message to its
citizens-public health is a fundamental part of a government's duty of
care to its citizens, and as such the government is entrusted with the
responsibility of regulating the safety of the food we eat.
While it may seem obvious at the conclusion of this comment that
food producers can be found liable to consumers for less-than-pure prod-
ucts, such liability cannot be deemed obvious given the multitude of
legal loopholes that are conveniently built in to the American food regu-
latory scheme. As the sole realistic providers from which Americans can
get their food, producers must be deemed to owe a higher duty of care to
us; if a particular cosmetic or appliance is harmful to consumers, they
have the option of merely purchasing that product from a different man-
ufacturer-a built-in remedy in the event a products liability suit fails.
Food presents a wholly different scenario: Competition is virtually non-
existent. 30 1 The meat and produce available in the average supermarket
is pre-selected for the consumer, and options outside of that selection are
unobtainable for the vast majority of Americans. More importantly, the
strict liability analysis this comment puts forth for food producers
applies equally to the government. Once again, food safety is a one-man
show: Consumers are powerless to "vote with their feet," and as such are
powerless to meaningfully voice their opinions about food safety issues.
If that isn't enough to create a heightened duty of care to consumers, the
American food safety statutory scheme is. The FD&C Act vests shared
responsibility in the FDA and food producers themselves to keep con-
sumers safe from the minefield of dangers present in the food supply.
Americans are essentially on notice, in the same way patients in hospi-
tals or citizens relying on the city police department are, that some entity
other than they are responsible for food safety. Yet as is made clear in
this comment, the regulatory scheme fails and allows food that makes us
sick-but makes food producers' profits skyrocket-not only to enter
the food supply, but to dominate it. The FDA's attitude toward geneti-
cally modified food does not differ in any material way from its attitude
toward conventional food, despite the fundamental fact that genetic
engineering essentially makes a science fair project out of our food-
and virtually no data exists regarding the health consequences. However,
sufficient evidence exists that the FDA has full knowledge of the poten-
tial dangers of the food products it regulates, but approves them anyway
until such time as enough people get sick that consumers demand
change. The demand must come now-we, as consumers, deserve food
301. See discussion supra pp. 206-07.
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that doesn't kill us and a government that takes the kind of responsibility
the State of Minnesota does for our health and safety.
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